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AUTHOR Pearce, W. Barnett; Cushman, Donald P.
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ABSTRACT

In order to provide a critical test of a proposed procedure for explaining and validating a rules theory, this paper examines four items of communications research which make claims regarding the generality and practical necessity of the empirical relationships they investigate. The paper demonstrates the utility of the procedure for rigorously assessing the acceptability of claims regarding the generality and necessity of normative rules. The approach is divided into three parts: an examination of the criteria to be met if research is to account for rules properly; the application of these criteria to the four items of research; and the drawing of conclusions regarding the adequacy of the model employed within diverse rules methodologies. The criteria employed for locating the generality and necessity of various rules claims and the exact nature of the support for these claims indeed appear to serve their analytic and critical functions. (Author/DF)

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RESEARCH EMPLOYING THE CONSTRUCT "COMMUNICATION RULES": AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS OF VERIFICATION

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by

W. Barnett Pearce and Donald P. Cushman

University of Massachusetts State University of New York at Albany

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W. Barnett Pearce
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Several recent articles have called for or employed procedures based on the construct "rule." In most formulations, rules are differentiated from other explanatory modalities in that they have force only when adopted by their users, they "govern and guide" intentional and meaningful action, and they facilitate interpersonal coordination when consensually shared.[1]

Predictably, the introduction of the construct "rule" as a basis for communication research has provoked a mixed response. Some see it as an attempt to escape the rigorous empirical requirement of a search for covering laws, or as a tender-minded aversion to a causal model of human behavior. Criticisms of the prospect of research about communication rules may be classified into three groups: those who say that: 1) the notion of communication rules precludes doing acceptable research, in which case it becomes a matter of speculative philosophy and can be ignored, 2) rules research will resemble that based on the assumption of covering laws except that it will make weaker epistemic claims, in which case it becomes a matter of doing "soft" research and should be avoided, or 3) rules research will be indistinguishable from that based on other theoretic positions, in which case the issue becomes merely semantic and a waste of journal space. The thrust of such criticisms center on the assumption that researchers employing the construct "communication rules" have failed to invoke procedures of explanation and verification which have the same rigor as those employed in causal and systems research.[2]

In an earlier paper we attempted to respond to the first of these criticisms by considering the formal requirements of explanation within causal, systems and rules based theories of communication. We argued that:

> Regardless of context, content or structure a set of propositions does not "count as" a theory unless it refers to phenomena which are general rather than particular and unless it describes relationships which are necessary rather than accidental.[3]

Two tests of generality were suggested. Syntactical generality refers to the all or nothing form of the theoretical propositions and domain generality refers to the number and type of initial conditions which restrict the range of phenomena covered by the propositions.

Three types of necessity were identified and the explanatory paradigms which guaranteed the presence of a verifiable relationship were explicated. Causal theories employing a nomological deductive framework for explanation were viewed as providing claims of nomic necessity, or that there exist some knowable characteristics in nature such that locating them guarantees that a proposed relationship must occur.[3] Systems theories employing mathematical calculi for explanation were viewed as providing claims of logical necessity, or that there exists a network of relationships such that by definition a change in one relationship guarantees a change in the others.[5] Rules theories employing the practical syllogism for explanation were viewed as providing claims of practical necessity, or that there exist normative forces which exert pressures on actors to select certain goals and appropriate means for achieving the specified goals, and that locating an actor's awareness of these forces will guarantee that he will follow the prescribed relationship.[6]

We concluded by describing the verification procedures each of these

explanatory paradigms must employ to establish generality and necessity. While the procedures of explanation and verification employed within the causal and systems perspective were well known and had been applied rigorously in previous research, we indicated that the analysis of the rules perspective was a construction and extension as well as a review of previous efforts. While our effort was tentative, the analysis does suggest a structure for rules theory which has generality and necessity. This theoretical structure provides the basis for deriving rigorous criteria for the validity of propositions claiming practical necessity. A Communication study which makes claims regarding the practical force of rules must address the epistemic claims that there are rules which apply to a particular domain including the specific instance being studied, that these rules have force, and that the communication which occurs was governed by these rules. To the extent that these procedures of explanation and verification are acceptable, they comprise a rigorous theoretical procedure for guiding communication research from a rules perspective.

In this paper we will examine four pieces of rules research which make claims regarding the generality and practical necessity of the empirical realtionships they investigate in an effort to provide a critical test of our procedure for exaplanation and validation. Our aim will be to demonstrate the utility of such a procedure for rigorously assessing the acceptability of claims regarding the generality and necessity of normative rules. Such a task divides itself into three parts: 1) an examination of those criteria which must be met if research is to have theoretic import in a rules perspective; 2) the application of these criteria to the four studies under consideration; and 3) the drawing of some conclusions regarding the adequacy of the model of explanation and verification when employed within diverse rules methodologies.

Two caveats are in order. First, our analysis of rules research will be restricted in domain to action theoretic approaches conducted with a coordination focus. Previously, we indicated that this is but one of several approaches to rules theory.[6] Second, the criteria employed within this perspective facilitate an assessment of the extent to which studies generate the types of information required to support a theory which has the formal properties of generality and necessity. To the extent that a study is intentionally atheoretic--and some researchers claim to be uninterested in theory--or is based on a theory which does not claim these characteristics, the criteria will be inappropriate, and such studies must be critiqued on other grounds.

CRITERIA FOR THEORY-RELEVANT STUDIES OF COMMUNICATION RULES

Previously, we argued that the viability of a rules theory based on practical necessity depends on a series of metaphysical assumptions. First, it is assumed that human behavior can be divided into at least two classes of activity: those which are stimulus-response activities and governed by nomic necessity and those which are purposive and choice oriented responses and governed by practical necessity. The former behaviors are habitual and termed movements while the latter are evaluative and termed actions. Rules theorists argue that there exists a realm of human action in which persons have some degree of choice among alternatives, critique theor performance, exercise self-monitoring capacities and act in response to practical or normative forces.[8]

Second, rules theorists argue that there exist two classes of human actions: those in which an individual's choices among alternatives, critiques of his performance, exercise of self-monitoring and capacity to response to practical force requires communication and those which do not. The former are termed coordination

situations and function to regulate consensus among individuals in regard to a common task while the latter are termed information processing situations and function to regulate human perception and thought in regard to some task. Communication rules theorists thus argue that (1) there exists a class of human action which involves conjoint, combined and associated behavior, (2) that the transfer of symbolic information facilitates such behavior, (3) that the transfer of symbolic information requires the interaction of sources, messages and receivers guided and governed by communication rules and (4) that the communication rules form general and specific patterns which provide the basis for the explanation, prediction and control of communication behavior.

Third, rules theorists in a coordination framework argue that the basic unit of analysis for communication research is a standardized usage. More specifically they suggest:

> ...that there exist systems of rule governed symbol meaning associations which are relatively persistent because the participants engaged in some task have found the system particularly useful for coordinating their activities in regard to that task.[9]

Such a system of code and network rules is termed a standardized usage. Within such a system of communication rule sequences there will exist individual sequences of communication behaviors which are termed episodes. Episodes consist of communicator's interpretations of the actual sequences of messages they jointly produce.[10] These episodes are aimed at facilitating coordination in regard to some task and carry differential practical force depending on their contribution to the coordination process. Such episodic sequences of communication behavior are the basis for theories of communication behaviors in a rules context.

A research program consistent with these assumptions involves (1) locating the task which is the generative mechanism for a standardized usage, (2) describing the episodic sequences which constitute the standardized usage and assessing their generality and practical force and (3) indicating the structure which the rules theory will take given its level of generality and necessity.

1. Locating the task which is the generative mechanism for a standardized usage. Consistent with the concept of human action as purposive and meaningful, rules are conceptualized as criteria for choice. A person or group may adopt a set of rules (in which case they are said to be in force), subsequently unadopt them, readopt; and so on. These criteria for choice may be personal and govern individual thought processes, in which case they are idiographic and unobservable, or they may be public rules used to coordinate human interaction, in which case they are shared and observable. When we restrict our analysis to tasks which require coordination between individuals for their completion, we are guaranteeing that the rules employed will be in force, observable and necessary for fulfilling a task. It is this condition that marks a coordination task as the "generative mechanism" for sequences of rules which govern and guide human interaction in regard to that task. By specifying the coordination task which generates a set of rules, a study makes the dual claim that a particular set of rules exist in observable form and that they are in force in a particular instance.

2. Describing the episodic sequences which constitute the standardized usage and assessing their generality and necessity. The specification of a coordination task allows a researcher to isolate the specific set of episodes involved in fulfilling a task. A coordination task yields a standardized usage by quantifying the number of points at which communication is required, prohibited or permitted in order to fulfill a task. Each of these points will involve

a specific sequence of communication behaviors, or an episode. Episodic sequences must then be ordered to fulfill the task. For example "going to church" is an important coordination task for members of a religious community. The fulfillment of this task requires that actors perform several communication sequences in a particular order. One must communicate to the family the time selected to leave for church and the means of getting there. One must communicate with the usher in order to take one's place in a pew. One must respond at the appropriate times and one must leave on cue. When one has performed these episodic sequences in the proper order, one has fulfilled the task of "going to church."

An important feature of a rules perspective is that the rules sequences are measured from an actor's point of view.[11] One method for measuring the generality and practical necessity of an episodic sequence is to assess an actor's perceptions of the crystalization and intensity of a rule sequence. Crystalization refers to the perceived commonality of expectations held by others for an actor to perform a given sequence of behavior in the coordination situation. The greater the commonality of perceived expectations, the greater the generality of the behavioral sequence. The greater the diversity of expectations, the less likely a given behavioral sequence will be viewed as central to a coordination task. Intensity refers to the perceived consequences which follow from performing or not performing a given behavioral sequence for achieving a task. The greater the positive or negative consequences for performing an episodic sequence, the greater the liklihood a given behavioral sequence will be performed or avoided. To the extent that the consequences for performing an episodic sequence are perceived as neutral, the less practical force to perform or avoid the sequence. An assessment of the crystalization and intensity of each episodic sequences will allow one to model the standardized usage as to its generality and necessity in achieving a given task.

Two problems arise in locating episodic sequences and ordering them into a standardized usage. First, episodic sequences may vary in the extent to which their enactment is fully specified or optional. For example, a episode may be successfully enacted by any of several sequences of messages (creating what Cushman and Pearce call a "multiple sufficiency" condition) while another episode's successful enactment requires a precise set of messages (creating a "necessity" condition).[12] Further, some episodes are structurally standardized while others are enigmatic.[13] Thus far in the development of rules research, there is no theory-derived criterion for determining the extent to which an episodic structure should be specified. In fact, an area in which research may be extremely profitable is that of determining what types of generative mechanisms produce fully specified or loosely specified episodic sequences, and exploring how persons perceive different sequences of messages as alternative forms of the "same" episode.

The second problem has to do with the manner in which the generative mechanism orders the episodic sequences. Some sequences may be obligatory, others prohibited, still others permitted, while others are normatively indifferent to the task. Theoretic means are needed to delineate which of these normative forces are at work.

3. Indicating the structure which the rules theory will take, given its level of generality and necessity. When the generality and necessity of the episodic sequences which constitute a standardized usage have been assessed, we are then in a position to indicate the exact structure which a theory of this rule governed sequence must take. Following von Wright we will employ the practical syllogism as the theoretic model of human action within a rules perspective.[14] The model instance of practical reasoning is:

A intends to bring about C.

A considers that in order to bring about C he must do B.

Therefore A sets himself to do B.

The major premise indicates the goal, the minor premise the episodic sequence's contribution to achieving the goal and the conclusion specifies that the action is triggered. The practical force of the syllogism rests on the strength of intention or consequences which follow from achieving or not achieving the goal. The generality of the syllogism is tied to the commonality of expectations regarding the major and minor premises.

The simplest type of coordination situation is one in which one episodic sequence of behavior involving two persons is necessary and sufficient to yield the desired goal.

A and B intend to bring about C.

A and B know that in order to bring about C, they must engage in episode D.

A and B engage in episode D.

A and B's belief, which is expressed the minor premise, is based on their knowledge of and assumption that the relevant other person shares a set of rules in regard to a given task.

A second type of coordination situation is one in which one episodic sequence of behavior involving two persons is necessary but not sufficient to yield the desired goal.

A and B intend to bring about C.

A and B know that without episode D, C will not occur.

And B engage in episode D.

A and B's belief, which is expressed in the minor premise, depends on both the value of C for A and B and the degree of probability they associate with the other necessary conditions being performed.

A third type of coordination situation is one in which an episodic sequence

of behaviors involving two persons involves multiple sufficient conditons.

A and B intend to bring about C.

A and B know that C will occur if he and the other person engage in episodes D or E or F...

A and B each believe the other person will do D.

A and B engage in episode D.

The amount of practical force in this context depends on the value of C for A and B and on strength of their belief that the other person will do D.

A fourth type of coordination situation is one in which an episodic sequence of behavior between two persons involves a rule violation which leads to a breakdown in coordination. The possibility of rule violation accounts for the unique character of rules research. The interposition of a human decision point in selecting mean and ends and the required knowledge and skill involved in executing a given means-ends relationship account for the circumstances which can yield rule violations. However, under the presence of strong normative force rule violations should be followed by one of three types of behavior. First, an actor may provide an account or explanation for his failure to respond to the normative force thus forstalling the consequence of rule violations. Scott and Lyman identify two classes of accounts: excuses and justifications.[15] Excuses acknowledge the rule violation but plead the intervention of outside influences, thus mitigating the appropriateness of punishment for violation. Justifications acknowledge the rule violation, but appeal to a stronger normative force which made violations not only appropriate but necessary. Second, intentional rule violations which are not accompanied by an account should be followed by punishment of the violator. Such punishments may range from financial, as in the case of a speeding ticket, to exclusion from the coordinative system, as in the case of deportation of social undesirables. Third, non-intentional

rule violations which are not accompanied by an account should be followed by an adjustment to the rule. When an actor unintentionally violates a rule and the rule is cited he will adjust his behavior to the rule. Any of these three types of behaviors following rule violations offer evidence to the presence of normative force or practical necessity in the rules.

Many feel that predictive ability is the single most important characteristic of science: for example, some positivists equate prediction with explanation. But the rationale and assumptions of rules research preclude the use of prediction as the ultimate test of the veracity of a theory. Even with a well-specified generative mechanism plus a detailed episodic sequence with considerable practical force, a theorist would not expect 100% predictability and might be uneasy if it were obtained. In some instances, at least, individuals will be expected to strain the limits or violate the rules. The interposition of a decision point between practical force and action thus has two significant effects. First, it precludes behavioral predictability as the ultimate criterion of theoretical verification. Even if the theory is true, behavior in specific instances--particularly those instances most interesting to a biographer or historian--might deviate from anticipated patterns. However, the claim that the observed behavior constitutes a deviation is a plausible one and can be verified by assessing other participants' expectations or evaluations of the relevant behavior. Second, it enables a rules theorist to critique as well as describe what people do. Appropriate evaluative judgments can be made about a person who acts in ways which conform to or deviate from measured levels of practical force. <u>These judgments are particularly useful in situations in which there are conflicting practical forces resulting from multiple generative mechanisms</u>. In this way studies of communication rules share the characteristics of both acience

and the humanities.

When one has located the coordination task which generates a standardized usage and assessed the generality and practical necessity of the episodic sequences involved, then one can construct a rules theory modeling a given task in accordance with the practical syllogism by specifying the episodic sequence as sufficient, multiply sufficient or necessary for the achievement of a task.

We are now in a position to apply our analysis to four rules studies in order to evaluate our model of explanation and validation.

A CRITIQUE OF FOUR STUDIES

Four prominent pieces of rules research have been selected for analysis, each employing a different methodology. One takes an ethnographic approach, one survey, one an experimental and one an ordinary language focus.

Speaking Like a Man in Teamsterville[16] by Gerry Philipsen investigates the rules governing "the appropriateness of speaking versus other actional strategies (such as silence, violence, or non-verbal threats) in male role enactment or self-presentation" by men in a blue-collar suburb of a midwestern U. S. city.[17] Philipsen employs participant observation and interview techniques of data collection and an ethnography of communication procedures in data analysis. Two episodic sequences are located for fulfilling the task of asserting one's manliness in Teamsterville. (1) "When the social identity relationship of the participants in a situation is symmetrical, the situation can appropriately realize a great amount of talk by a Teamsterville man."[18] Symmetrical social identity relationships are operationalized as individuals matched by age, sex, ethnicity, occupational status, and residents who are longtime friends. The two principle situations where such interactions occur are the street corner for boys

and the corner bar for men. (2) A high quantity of speaking is considered inappropriate in situations in which the participants' identity relationships are asymmetrical.[19] Asymmetrical relationships are operationalized as those involving a wife, child, boss, or outsider. Speaking through intermediaries is appropriate for these situations in which a Teamsterville resident must impress or influence status superiors or outsiders. Pride is taken in having "connections" like the ward committeeman who will intercede in one's behalf. The use of talk is inappropriate in situations when a man has been insulted and he seeks to influence the behavior of a status inferior.[20] Physical action is obligatory in such situations for the successful performance of a masculine role.

A particularly suggestive procedure is employed by Dr. Philipsen for assessing the commonality of expectations for performing these episodic sequences as well as the consequences which ensue from following or failing to follow a given episodic sequence. Evidence is introduced regarding the effect of rule violations on the episodic sequences. Each violation resulted in an attempt by all the males present to force the violator to conform to the appropriate episodic sequence by citing the rules. When the citation of the rule failed to elicit the appropriate behavioral response, all the males present broke off interaction with the violator, viewing him as an "outsider" who was unable to discern a threat to the credibility of his male role.[21] Such an analysis demonstrates that the behavioral sequences involve practical necessity rather than causal or logical necessity and that the high degree of crystalization and intensity involved in the sequences make them both necessary and sufficient for asserting one's male role in Teamsterville. The generality and necessity of the two episodic sequences are thus modeled by the simplest form of the practical syllogism and carry the force of obligation.

A intends to bring about a recognition of his manliness.

> A knows that in order to bring about such a recognition he must engage in Episodes 1 or 2 (given the appropriate circumstances cited above).
>
> A engage in Episodes 1 or 2.

Whether these two sequences are the only sequences involved in the standardized usage of asserting one's manliness in Teamsterville is an open question.

In summary, Dr. Philipsen's research locates a coordination task which generates a standardized usage, describes the episodic sequences involved and assesses their generality and practical necessity, which we can model by the appropriate mood of the practical syllogism.

Some Signals and Rules for Taking Speaking Turns in Conversation by Starkey Duncan, Jr. investigates the "turn-taking mechanism, whereby participants manage the smooth and appropriate exchange of speaking turns in face-to-face interaction." According to this investigator:[22]

> The variables for the turn-taking mechanism were formulated as signals by which each participant indicated his state with regard to the speaking turn. Given the display or absence of a given turn-taking signal by one participant, rules delimit the appropriate responses by the other participant. The rules and signals, considered together, establish empirical expectations with respect to turn-taking activities at any given moment in a conversation, assuming that the participants in the conversations under analysis are rule abiding for the most part.[23]

The task of managing the smooth and appropriate exchange of speaking turns is regulated by three episodic sequences or rules. (1) An auditor may, but does not have to, take his speaking turn when the speaker displays a turn-yielding signal. A turn-yielding signal is described as the display of at

least one of a set of six behavioral cues. These are intonation, paralanguage cues, body movement, sociocentric sequences, gesticulation cues and syntactical cues. (2) An auditor may not take a speaking turn when the speaker displays a turn-suppressing signal. The turn-suppressing signal consists of one or both of the speakers hands being engaged in gesticulation. (3) An auditor may decline a turn by producing a backchannel cue when the speaker displays a turn-yielding cue. Backchannel cues are described as the display of at least one of the following behaviors: making the utterance "umhmm" or "yeah," nodding the head, the auditor completing the sentence the speaker began, requests for clarification, restatement of the speaker's idea.[24]

Following from this analysis Duncan hypothesizes that

> The rules for turn-yielding and attempt suppressing lead to the expectations that (a) the occurrence of simultaneous turns will be associated primarily with the auditor's turn-yielding attemppts when zero yielding cues (i.e., the absence of a yielding signal) are being displayed by the speaker, and (b) display of the attempt-suppressing signal by the speaker will sharply reduce the auditor's turn-taking attempts in response to yielding cues.[25]

Duncan then employs his rules in analyzing two 19-minute conversations which involve 100 interactions between speakers in a dyad. Duncan found that when no turn-yielding cues were displayed there were zero cases of smooth exchanges of turn and 12 instances of simultaneous turn-taking. When one or more turn-yielding cues were displayed there were 81 smooth exchanges and 7 simultaneous turns. Attempt-suppressing signals "essentially eliminated an auditor's tendency to take his turn regardless of the number of turn-yielding cues displayed."

This study did not report information on back-channeling.[26]

While Duncan's results suggest the presence of very strong behavioral regularities in regard to turn-yielding and attempt-suppressing signals, the type of necessity involved in these regularities is undetermined. In order to rule out causal and logical necessity and demonstrate practical necessity, we are in need of information regarding what happened after a rule violation. If simultaneous speaking were followed by an account, be it an excuse or justification, then strong evidence would exist that the sequence involved practical force. If simultaneous speaking was followed by the speaker's attempt to regain control of the interaction by giving additional cues to regulate interaction in the manner specified by the rules, one could infer that the speaker viewed the sequence as involving practical force. Additionally, if simultaneous speaking were followed by the auditor citing a rule and the speaker correcting his behavior accordingly, then strong evidence would exist that practical force was involved. If simultaneous speaking was followed by no attempt at correction and by interaction continuing, then causal or logical forces may be at work.

Given these indetermencies in the generality and necessity of the behavioral sequences involved, it is not possible to model the theories by the appropriate mood of the practical syllogism.

In summary, Duncan's research locates a coordination task which generates a set of behavioral sequences. He describes these behavioral sequences through the use of rules, but fails to adequately assess their generality and practical necessity. Therefore, it is not possible to model the behavioral sequences involved by the appropriate mood of the practical syllogism.

Normative Explanations of Helping Behavior by Shalom H. Schwartz examines several criticisms of normative explanations and formulates a response to these

criticism.[27] Schwartz notes three common criticisms of normative explanations. First, norms are stated too vaguely and are too general to account for concrete actions in specific situations. Second, using social norms to account for individual differences in behavior amounts to trying to explain a variable by a constant. Third, a situation may frequently be governed by several relevant norms which often contradict one another. A theory of personal norms is proposed to counter these criticisms. By personal norms, Schwartz refers to the expectations people hold for themselves. "What distinguishes a norm as personal is that the sanctions attached to it are tied to the self-concept: anticipation of or actual violation of the norm results in guilt, self-depreciation, loss of self-esteem; conformity or its anticipation results in pride, enhanced self-esteem, security."[28] Schwartz postulates that the activation of personal norms relevant to helping requires that the individuals: "(1) become aware of consequences for the welfare of people in a situation; (2) hold personal norms enjoining action pertinant to these consequences; and (3) feel some capability to control the action enjoined and its outcomes - some personal responsibility."[29] It follows from this analysis that the activation of personal norms varies with the salience of consequences in the situation and the salience of personal responsibility. There are thus two ways one can neutralize a personal norm: (1) denial of consequences and (2) denial of personal responsibility. Schwartz thus hypothesizes that the "association between personal norms and overt behavior increases as a positive function of the conditions which promote activation and prevent neutralization of norms."[30] To test this hypothesis an experimental methodology is employed to analyze the volunteering behavior of 253 female clerical workers. The sample was subdivided by three levels of Ascriptions of Responsibility (high, moderate, low) and four levels of Personal Norms (strong, weak, none and negative) Figure 1 contains the results.[31]

A single planned comparison was used to test the hypothesis. Note that differences due to personal norms are predicted to emerge as Ascriptions of Responsibility to Self increase. In general, the pattern of findings was as predicted, even in the case of negative norms where increases in Ascription of Responsibility should lead to a decline in volunteering behavior. The results of the planned comparison were significant at the $p < .0001$ level with the Ar X Personal norm interaction accounting for 17% of the variance in volunteering. The correlations were $r = .01$ low AR, $r = .27$ moderate AR, $r = .44$ high AR.[32]

What then can be concluded about the generality and necessity of this analysis? Schwartz has isolated a coordination task, namely volunteering. He has located the domain of four episodic sequences involving volunteering. Schwartz's design provides a direct measure of crystalization and intensity. Schwartz then demonstrates as individuals become more aware that a given situation allows them to follow their personal norms, they evoke behavioral sequences or episodes consistent with their personal norms. The manipulation of awareness of Personal Norms and Ascription of Responsibility to the Self serves the same function as citing a rule and asking one who holds the rule to conform to it. Thus the Ascription of Responsibility X Personal Norm interaction is a direct measure of the generality and practical force of an episodic sequence. Thus, under the conditions of High Ascription of Responsibility and strong Personal Norms the episodic sequences involved is both necessary and sufficient for the achievement of the task, and as such is modeled by the simplest form of the practical syllogism.

A intends to bring about a realization of his personal norms.

A knows that in order to realize his personal norm he must engage in a specific episodic sequence

A engages in that episodic sequence

In summary, Dr. Schwartz's research locates a coordination task which generates a standardized usage, describes one episodic sequence involved in that standardized usage and assesses its generality and practical necessity which we can model by the appropriate mood of the practical syllogism.

The Demand Ticket: A Conversational Device for Getting the Floor by Robert Nofsinger, Jr. investigates the rules governing phrases which when introduced into discourse serve as tickets demanding the return of the floor to the person who initiates them.[33] Such a ticket serves four functions. First, it gets the attention of the intended conversational partner. Second, it gives the speaker's role to the individual who utters the phrase. Third, it can be used to switch speaker's roles in an on-going conversation. Finally, it obligates its initiator to speak and it obligates the acceptor to listen.

Nofsinger then lists five rules which constitute the demand ticket. "Rule 1: A wishes to have the floor to say Z to B, and wishes to be obligated to say Z to B."[34] This rule states the reason for which the demand ticket is initiated; without it a statement may be seen as pointless. "Rule 2: A, in the utterance of X, fails to explicate Z, and there is no other reason immediately apparent to B for A's having uttered Z."[35] It is this quality in the demand ticket that requires one to return to the floor to the speaker. "Rule 3: A intends to utter Z when given the floor by B."[36] This is the sincerity condition for the use of the demand ticket and entails that A believes he can utter Z. "Rule 4: A intends that his utterance of X will obligate B to utter Y under conditions which will,

in turn, obligate A to utter Z and obligate B to listen to Z."[37] It is this rule which sets up the chain of conditionally relevant utterances which leads to his being obligated to make the statement required. "Rule 5: A intends to produce in B the recognition that A intends that the utterance of X is to count as obligating B to obligate A to say Z, etc."[38] This represents B's recognition of A's intention.

Next Nofsinger outlines the procedural rules which govern the demand ticket. Drawing on "The Logic of Conversation" by Grice, Nofsinger argues that the fundamental rule governing conversation is that its participants cooperate to make it work. More specifically the cooperative rule states:

> "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk-exchange in which you are engaged."[39]

Two corollaries are then stated. The first is called the pertinence rule.

> "Do not say that which is pointless or spurious."[40]

The second is the interpretive rule:

> "I interpret the utterance of your conversational partner as being in accordance with the cooperative principle and its maxims, if at all possible."[41]

Together these three regulative rules interact with the constitutive rules to form the conversational logic of the demand ticket, the key feature of which is that "the context in which it is uttered provides no apparent reason for its utterance."[42]

Dr. Nofsinger employs an ordinary language methodology in the traditions of Searle and Grice. Such an analysis assumes "that the technical conditions for the performance of conversation are ideal, e.g., that all participants can

speak and hear satisfactorily, that they speak a dialect the rules of which recognize and permit the use of the demand ticket, etc."[43] Unlike the previously examined pieces of research, Nofsinger's work is more rational than empirical and has used as data the "conversational intuitions of communicators."[44] Such an analysis seeks to illuminate the logic of discourse in ideal speech situations by referring to the ordinary use of discourse in everyday conversation. The net result of such a procedure is to isolate a common task, like the returning of the floor to a speaker, note the standardized usage and episodic sequences involved, such as the utterance of phrases in a context in which the utterances makes no apparent sense, and then to abstract the logic which must have existed for such a set of phrases to coherently serve the function of a demand ticket. The generality and necessity of the sequences involved are assumed to be necessary and sufficient in this ideal realm.

Two problems confront us in assessing the value of such a methodology. First, the validity of an ordinary language analysis rests on an appeal to the manner in which discourse functions in actual speech communities. While both Searle and Grice assume that the rules they formulate are universal to discourse and thus apply to all speech communities, empirical evidence exists that this is indeed not the case.[45] In such instances the generality and practical necessity of the analysis is called into question. Since Nofsinger does not claim universality for his analysis, but does assume a speech community in which the demand ticket is the relevant mode of talk, he claims logical force for his analysis rather than causal or practical force. Second, while Nofsinger thus does stipulate a task which generates a standardized usage and locates the episodic sequences involved in fulfilling the task we are unable to determine the crystalization and intensity of the sequences in a language community and we

thus are unable to model the sequences by the appropriate mood of the practical syllogism.

DRAWING SOME CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE CURRENT STATE OF RULES RESEARCH

Our task has been to evaluate the utility of a model for the explanation and verification of one class of rules theories, namely those which make claims regarding the normative force of communication rules employed in coordination situations. Our analysis of these four studies was intended to be exemplary rather than evaluative. These four studies were not guided by the issues raised in this paper and were not designed to be responsive to those issues. However, our analysis of the proposed model for explanation and validation was meant to be evaluative rather than exemplary. What then can we conclude from our rather brief analysis?

Two conclusions suggest themselves. First, the criteria employed for locating the generality and necessity of various rules claims and the exact nature of the support for these claims appears to serve its analytic and critical function. The procedures involved in (1) locating the task which is the generative mechanism for a standardized usage, (2) describing the episodic sequences which constitute the standardized usage and assessing their generality and necessity and (3) indicating the structure which the rules theory will take, given its level of generality and necessity appears to be capable of distinguishing the precise nature of the theoretic claim which can be drawn and the issues which require further support if the claim is to serve as a basis for explanation. Such a procedure provides clear benchmarks for guiding theoretic research by indicating the exact nature of the claims made and what will constitute a valid test of those claims.

Second, our analysis seems to suggest that a variety of empirical methodologies may be employed to provide evidence for such claims. While each of the researchers and methodologies examined were not specifically attempting to meet the specific criteria proposed for explanation and validation, our brief analysis indicates that any of these methodologies should be capable of providing such evidence.

We have attempted to provide a model of explanation and validation for one class of rules theories which has the same degree of precision as those found in other similar models in the social sciences. Our attempt, though tentative, appears to have been useful. It awaits the test of additional research.

FOOTNOTES

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2. See Charles R. Berger, "The Covering Law Perspective as a Theoretical Basis for the Study of Human Communication," Communication Quarterly, 25, 1977, 7-18.

3. D. Cushman and W. B. Pearce, "Generality and Necessity in Three Types of Theory About Human Communication with Special Attention to Rules Theory," Human Communication Research, 3, 1977, 344.

4. Cushman and Pearce, p. 346.

5. Cushman and Pearce, pp. 347-348.

6. Cushman and Pearce, pp. 348-352.

7. Cushman and Pearce, pp. 348-349.

8. Stephen Toulmin, "Concepts and the Explanation of Human Behavior" in Theodore Mischel (ed.), Human Action, New York: Academic Press, 1969, pp. 71-104; also see George H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971, p. 21

9. Cushman and Whiting, 1972, p. 219.

10. Pearce, 1976, pp. 21-24.

11. John Fisher, "Knowledge of Rules" Review of Metaphysics, December 1974, pp. 237-260. Also see W. Barnett Pearce, "An Overview of Communication and Interpersonal Relationships," in MODCOM (Palo Alto: SRA, 1976), Ron Applbaum and Rod Hart, (eds.).

12. Cushman and Pearce, pp. 17-19.

13. See Rom Harré and Paul Secord, The Explanation of Social Behavior (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams) 1973, pp. 147-176.

14. von Wright, pp. 107-117.

15. M. Scott and S. Lyman, "Accounts," American Sociological Review, 1968, pp. 46-62.

16. Gerry Philipsen, "Speaking 'Like a Man' in Teamsterville: Culture Patterns of Role Enactment in an Urban Neighborhood," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 61 1975, 13-22.

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22. Starkey Duncan, Jr., "Some Signals and Rules for Taking Speaking Turns in Conversations," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 23, 1972, 283-292.

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24. Duncan, pp. 286-288.

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27. Shalom H. Schwartz, "Normative Explanations of Helping Behavior: A Critique. Proposal, and Empirical Test," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 9, 349-364.

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32. Schwartz, p. 359.

33. Robert E. Nofsinger, Jr., "The Demand Ticket: A Conversational Device for Getting the Floor," Speech Monographs, 42, 1975, 1-19.

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36. Nofsinger, p. 5.

37. Nofsinger, p. 5.

38. Nofsinger, p. 6.

39. H. P. Grice, "The Logic of Conversation," 1968, Part II, Mimeographed, p. 7.

40. Grice, pp. 7-8.

41. Grice, p. 23.

42. Nofsinger, p. 8.

43. Nofsinger, p. 4.

44. Nofsinger, p. 9.

45. Elinor Ochs Keenan, "The Universality of Conversational Postulates," Language in Society, 5, 1975, 67-80.